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that, having no plan to counteract the process, he resigned himself to the outcome rather quickly.
The pivotal factor in speeding up German unification was the explosive expression of the
Germans' desire for it. Zelikow and Rice emphasize the ―judicious splashes of gasoline‖ applied
by Kohl and Bush ―instead of a fire extinguisher.‖ Yet the breakdown of public order in the
GDR began in December 1989 when Bush's position, as expressed at a NATO meeting, still left
open the possibility of a slow process with perhaps an uncertain outcome (―We should not at this
time endorse nor exclude any particular vision of unity‖). It was my impression from some of
Bush's remarks at Malta and even later that he might have preferred a slower process. Yet, once
the people of East Germany began to show their ability to impose their will, all leaders had to
adjust and a more welcoming attitude was only natural for Kohl and for Bush, as the Western
world's leader.
As to the attitude of the Soviet leaders, I recall no expressions of panic, either about the prospect
of German unification itself or about the domestic consequences of it in the Soviet Union. It is
notable that while experts on German affairs in the foreign ministry and the Communist Party
Central Committee called for maximum possible resistance to unification, a poll commissioned
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1990 indicated a generally positive attitude toward united
Germany among all strata of the population, including, surprisingly, the military. Credit for the
general acceptance of unification should be given to the Russian people, who both then and later
showed themselves to be much more level-headed and realistic than many members of the
Russian ―elite,‖ and to Gorbachev, whose ―calming influence‖ played an important role. In
subsequent conversations, Mikhail Gorbachev confirmed to me that at no point in the process
was the. use of force to prevent unification proposed as a possible course of action — either by
him, or by other members of the Soviet leadership, or by the military.
The study of the history of the Cold War and of the events that brought it to a peaceful end will
continue, producing both new factual material and new interpretations of the actions and motives
of the main players. In order to better understand what happened and why, historians may both
question the wisdom of the decisions taken by leaders and speculate on various scenarios
involving ―what if‖ and ―what might have been.‖ In fairness, however, they should try to put
themselves in the shoes of the decision-makers who had to contend with forces often beyond
their control in an environment changing at a breathtaking pace. The ―counterfactuals‖ proposed
for consideration mean little if they reflect policy ―options‖ not even considered at the time.