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among serious scholars as to its main turning points and achievements. I would note in passing
that George Shultz's regret, expressed at a conference at Princeton University in 1993, that,
mostly because of the resistance of hard-liners within the US administration, it proved
impossible to sign the START treaty in 1988, has received far less attention than it deserves. The
fact remains that the agreements achieved by Gorbachev, Reagan and Bush, including the
unprecedented exchange of letters between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev on the elimination of
much of the two countries' shorter-range nuclear weapons, were equitable and beneficial.
It may be argued that Europe was the centerpiece and the focus of the process that led to the end
of the Cold War. The most dramatic and potentially the most explosive developments in Europe
at the time were taking place in Germany. The leaders who had to manage that process are often
accused of lacking foresight, of failing to anticipate the events. It is questionable whether the
kind of prescience that the critics seem to call for is at all possible. The essay of Philip Zelikow
and Condoleezza Rice contains numerous quotes from statements and remarks by Soviet, US and
European leaders that leave no doubt that no one expected German unification to happen as fast
as it did. This includes the amazing comment of Helmut Kohl in December 1989 on Henry
Kissinger's supposition that the Germanys might unite within two years: ―this [is] obviously
impossible.‖ It is in any case doubtful whether even a better forecast would have done much
good. What mattered a lot more is the attitude of the main players toward the prospect of
German unification. The material provided by Zelikow and Rice is consistent with my own
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impressions at the time, based on what I heard during talks on the issue and discussions among
Soviet leaders of which I had some knowledge.
Margaret Thatcher manifested herself as the most suspicious of Germans as a nation and
viscerally antagonistic to the prospect of unification. During a meeting with Shevardnadze in
London in November 1989 she did not bother to disguise that antagonism. I recall the impression
of barely suppressed fury but also of impotence that she left. Certainly neither during that
meeting nor, to my knowledge, in subsequent discussions and communications with Soviet
leaders did she propose any steps or measures capable of slowing down the process. Rather, she
seemed to be trying to probe the depth of the Soviet leaders' apprehensions about German unity
and their willingness and ability to act against it. It appears from what we know now that
Mitterand's attitude, though perhaps less furious than that of Thatcher, was similar. Yet my
conversations with French diplomats in Moscow and the diplomatic cables from Paris suggested