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Джордж Акерлоф

536

Markopolos, No One Would Listen, Kindle locations 850–52.

537

David Kotz, Investigation of Failure of the SEC to Uncover Bernard Madoff ’s Ponzi Scheme, Report of Investigation Case No. OIG-509, United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of Inspector General (2011), pp. 61–77, accessed May 29, 2015, .

538

James B. Stewart, “How They Failed to Catch Madoff,” Fortune, May 10, 2011. Accessed May 2, 2015. .

539

Kotz, Investigation of Failure of the SEC to Uncover Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi Scheme, p. 249.

540

Kotz, Investigation of Failure of the SEC to Uncover Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi Scheme, p. 247.

541

Kotz, Investigation of Failure of the SEC to Uncover Bernard Madoff’s Ponzi Scheme, с. 250. Маркополос привел яркое описание беседы со своей точки зрения: No One Would Listen, Kindle location 2585 and following. See also Suh’s testimony on this subject: Kotz, Investigation of Failure of the SEC to Uncover Bernard Madoff ’s Ponzi Scheme, p. 251.

542

Lorena Mongelli, “The SEC Watchdog Who Missed Madoff,” New York Post, January 7, 2009.

543

Jeffrey Toobin, “Annals of Law: Money Unlimited: How Chief Justice John Roberts Orchestrated the Citizens United Decision,” New Yorker, May 21, 2012.

544

Cornell University Law School, Legal Information Institute, “Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (08-205),” accessed January 16, 2015, . See also Toobin, “Annals of Law.”

545

Toobin, “Annals of Law”; Oyez, “Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,” accessed March 18, 2005, .

546

Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 558 U.S. 310, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2010).

547

Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 558 U.S. 310, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2010).

548

Legal Institute, “Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n (No. 08-205),” accessed June 10, 2015, .

549

Legal Institute, “Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n (No. 08-205),” accessed June 10, 2015, .

550

Lawrence Lessig, Republic Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress – And a Plan to Stop It (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2011), p. 266.

551

Lawrence Lessig, Republic Lost: How Money Corrupts Congress – And a Plan to Stop It (New York: Hachette Book Group, 2011), p. 268.

552

Конечно, осталось еще немало экономистов, не воспринявших эти «общепринятые взгляды». К ним принадлежат два великих классика экономической теории – Торстейн Веблен (Веблен Т. Теория праздного класса. под общ. ред. В. В. Мотылева. Изд. 4-е. М., 2011.) и Джон Гэлбрейт (The Affluent Society. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958). Гораздо позже в двух совместных статьях Джон Хансон и Дуглас Кузар на фактическом материале показали, что отход от «экономической рациональности» (особенно в трактовке бихевиористской экономической теории) является прямым приглашением к «манипулированию». Они же проиллюстрировали последствия такого шага в сфере права и на многочисленных примерах из истории развития табачной промышленности. Hanson and Kysar, “Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation,” New York University Law Review 74, no. 3 (June 1999): 630–749, and “Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation,” Harvard Law Review 112, no. 7 (May 1999): 1420–1572.