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very forbidding man, perhaps. Certainly, I did not expect, when I first—I had not expected to see 

a man of a very friendly and amicable disposition and, as it turned out later, of a person who was 

quite ready to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union and to stand by that agreement, to make 

it stick. So, certainly, that was not the initial impression. 

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Q — Was there a moment where you saw the atmosphere change between Ronald Reagan and 

Mikhail Gorbachev? 

A — No, I don‘t think so. The atmosphere in the beginning was perhaps one of some mutual 

suspicion and not the same kind of trust that developed later. But the change was gradual. And 

from the very start, it was my impression that both men were very willing to work at their 

relationship, to really develop a rapport between them and to make it work for their countries.  

Q — What happened at Reykjavik? 

A — Reykjavik was an event—a watershed in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the 

United States. But even more, I think it was a psychological watershed, not just for our two 

countries but probably for the world, because it was in Reykjavik that, for the first time, the 

leaders of the two superpowers that had those mountains of nuclear weapons were speaking in 

terms not of propaganda but in terms of really possible scenarios and possible schedules about a 

world without nuclear weapons or with very, very few nuclear weapons. 

They came to that vision from very different perspectives, but it was probably the first time that 

two leaders shared that vision, despite the fact that that vision was not shared by the military and 

diplomatic bureaucracy of either the Soviet Union or of the United States. So that was a very 

important watershed. I think that in, let‘s say, 20 years, perhaps, or—Who knows?—30 years or 

maybe 15 years, when there will be no nuclear weapons on the face of the Earth, people will say 

it started in Reykjavik. 

Q — Did Mr. Gorbachev come to that meeting with a plan to zero out the number of nuclear 

missiles? 

A — No. His plan was for a very straightforward 50 percent cut in all categories of nuclear 

weapons. He also thought that the goal of abolishing nuclear weapons altogether was a 

worthwhile goal, that it was consistent with President Reagan‘s vision of a world without nuclear 

weapons but with defenses. Gorbachev thought that defenses were unnecessary in a world 

without nuclear weapons, but he shared the goal of a world without the nuclear threat. So his 

immediate goal, his immediate plan, was for a straightforward cut of 50 percent in all categories 

of strategic missiles and bombers, and that basically worked. With some adjustments, the plan 

was eventually accepted. It took some time to sign the treaty. The treaty was signed by Bush and 

Gorbachev in 1991, but basically, you can say that the plan worked. 

Q — But you say in your book that there was a time when they were together that Mr. Reagan 

looked confused and didn‘t seem to understand what was really going on.