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The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 stimulated Cold War power politics on America’s doorstep. Popular media, especially television, created a sense of immediacy augmented by high resolution aerial observation. Kennedy resolved that attacking the missiles was a real option. Declassified transcripts include his remarks: “/ don t think we got much time on these missiles…we can t wait two weeks while we're getting ready to roll. Maybe just have to just take them out, and continue our other preparations…”⁸ Dobrynin’s report of a meeting with Robert Kennedy reflected the betrayal the President felt at the allegedly short range defensive nature of the planned Russian missiles in Cuba being deployed as medium range weapons capable of striking anywhere in the USA.⁹ Notably, Krushchev did not consult with Castro on the final resolution of the matter.

The view of history which perpetuated the Cold War was one of apprehension on an unfolding “space age” horizon – as opposed to retrospective fear and conventional military stalemate. The view was futuristic, perhaps reckless. Both Krushchev and Kennedy pursued a policy of brinkmanship with the genuine prospect of nuclear calamity at a time when control systems for these weapons were still unsophisticated. The “arms race” characterising this policy was essentially illogical in that any nuclear strike was likely to escalate to broad based destruction and an arsenal of hundreds of ICBM’s exceeded any tactical requirement. Soviet management of this unstable situation became increasingly introverted as Krushchev was succeeded by internal contention for authority, initially by the “Troika”, then through the short terms of Andropov and Chernenko. Attempts by Breshnev and Carter to promote the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks foundered. The strategic situation was unchanged: both superpowers were breathless in pursuit of nuclear supremacy whilst a chasm developed in global economies: the wealth of the West compared to command economies in the East challenged the historical socialist view that capitalism would inevitably fail. Eastern Bloc States, witnessing this relative deprivation, sought greater autonomy. Breshnev advised the Politburo: “…It is… apparent that we are experiencing a very complicated period in the development of international relations. A serious deterioration and exacerbation of the situation has occurred. And the primary source of this deterioration is the growing aggression of the foreign policy of the Carter government¹⁰ As George Kennan advised Truman, Ronald Reagan might have been cautioned that the Soviet Bloc was expansionist and a natural response was “containment”, there being two variables in its modern form. The first was the Warsaw Pact crumbling through over extension and lack of investment. Secondly, a technology was needed to confound nuclear devastation. Reagan’s response was the Strategic Defence Initiative – derided as “Star Wars” – sustaining the view of history which perpetuated the Cold War: an unwavering belief in scientific advancement and yet a readiness to pull the trigger.